Nicky Johnston BBC. Related Story. Advertisement - Continue Reading Below. More From Soaps Spoilers. Hollyoaks star reveals big decision in Ste plot. Sat 13 Jul: Connie struggles to prove herself. Tue 16 Jul: 'Honeymoon'. Sat 06 Jul: Iain goes on a mission. For hate speech, while this is already covered as illegal content by the ECD system of notice and action, Option B would introduce an obligation to adopt proactive measures.
From a political viewpoint, Option B is the one that most effectively strikes a balance between the call from a number of Member States and the European Parliament for enhancing the protection of minors and viewers online and the need to preserve and promote freedom of speech, freedom to conduct a business and the ability for companies to innovate.
EU intervention under this option remains proportionate and is mainly based on co-regulation, allowing for national specificities to be taken into account. Option B it also proportionate as it would leave to the industry leeway to implement a regulatory obligation on a best effort basis. Option B is the preferred option. Safeguard the protection of minors and consumer protection social impacts.
Status quo. Option A. Option B. An adequate proportion of this quota has to be reserved to "recent" independent works. On-demand service providers, where practicable, must promote the production of and access to European works. Economic outcome. Some thematic and small channels bear higher costs to comply with quotas The e xisting administrative costs for regulators to monitor TV broadcasting services have been estimated at for all EU Regulators In the case of monitoring compliance of on-demand services, only some Member States have put in place a legal obligation for on-demand service providers to communicate data on compliance to national regulators.
The cost of monitoring has been estimated at 10 for all EU Regulators TV Broadcasters and on-demand service providers have reported medium to high existing adm inistrative costs in relation to reporting obligations on the promotion of European works. In practice, estimations show that annual administrative costs for all TV broadcasters in the EU are likely to vary among Member States and would approximately amoun t to EUR annually TV broadcasters devote widely the majority of qualifying time to European content.
In , European work s enjoyed an average of For on-demand services, as the Directive simply gives examples of how on demand services may promote European works, only 19 Member States have imposed obligations and they have done so in varied ways, i. Outcome on competitiveness: The different treatment between TV broadcasting and on-demand s ervices has resulted in TV broadcasting services operating under more constraints than on-demand services. Looking at the fast-development of on-demand services 98 in Europe as well as the worldwide medium term growth prospect see section 2.
Ultimately, the existence of larger constrains for TV broadcasting could reduce their flexibility to adapt to the viewers demands therefore undermining their attractiveness and thus their competiveness. On-demand services also have a greater flexibility and incentives to benefit from the internal market by establishing themselves in a particular country and distribute across Europe The existence of lower constraints on their editorial policy may have an impact in their choice of establishment, which may reinforce their competitive advantage compared to TV broadcasting services In their contribut ions to the Public consultation 3 Member States and 5 national regulators supported maintaining the status quo.
On the contrary, some commercial broadcasters 7 out of 30 called for repealing all current rules on promotion of European works, which would be then only subject to national rules. As for public service broadcasters, the majority 10 out of 16 would favour other options and mainly to reinforce rules on on-demand services. The current rules aim to ensure that consumers have access to European content. As mentioned above, the current rule for TV broadcasters resulted in European citizens being exposed to a significant amount of E uropean works.
As regards on-demand services, the low level of requirements imposed by some Member States has created gaps in the supply and promotion of European content on those services. Even if, given the size of the on-demand market, this impact is not yet very high, the growth prospect on this market may imply that the negative impact on cultural diversity will be higher in the future. Providers would be obliged to choose at least one option. In addition, Member States would allow on-demand services to promote European works either through a share of European works, their prominence in the catalogues or through a financial contribution.
On-demand service providers would be obliged to choose at least one option. It will be up to Member States to decide on the level of requirement for each measure. Substantive compliance costs: Option A would generate no additional costs for TV broadcasters who would be able to decide to move from a share of their broadcasting time to direct investment only if they are able to recoup the costs. For on-demand service s, the costs of complying with the new rules are difficult to assess as it will depend on the level of requirements set at national level.
As regards prominence, there are not such quantitative threshold s in the Member States. Recently, the European Audiovisual Observatory tried to identify the promotional spaces for each of the services of a sample of on-demand service providers in DE, FR, UK Consequently, this option would create zero or low additional costs for on-demand services established in those Member States where there are obligations in place.
On the contrary, on-demand services established in the 10 Member States where there is no obligation would have to face the cost of complying with at least one of the promotion measures shares, prominence or financial contributions. However, the costs are expected to be limited since on-demand services would opt for the less costly measure. Administrative costs: The additional administrative costs for regulators when implementing option A as regards TV broadcasting services would be zero.
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The costs of supervising on-demand services would depend on the choice made by on-demand service providers and on the monitoring system applied by the regulators. In this context it is not possible to estimate precisely the related costs but they are likely to be close to the costs incurred under the status quo. The additional administrative costs for TV broadcasters, if any, would be marginal as they would have to report on their programming budget instead of reporting on broadcasting time if they decide to invest a share of their programming budget in European works.
In countries where such systems are already in place, there would not be any additional costs. For on-demand services, due to the existing significant differences in national legislation and the variety of implementation measures in force, the monitoring costs for regulators would vary. In the 10 Members States where there are no requirements for on-demand service providers see ANNEX 13 , administrative costs would increase. Impacts on the Internal market: Option A is unlikely to result in a wider circulation of European works across Europe.
It is questionable whether a flexible requirement for on-demand services in particular, to opt either for a share or prominence of European works in their catalogues would be effective. A share in the catalogue alone would not necessarily lead to more consumption of European works.
Prominence would only make sense if a diverse catalogue would be available in the first place. Impacts on competitiveness: Option A is not expected to significantly impact TV broadcasting. As mentioned in the status quo option in , European works enjoyed an average of Broadcasters are expected to stick to this requirement they already comply with. Under Option A the impact on competitiveness of on-demand services would be limited since they would choose the less costly measure to fulfil their promotion obligations.
Option A would, based on the way providers choose to implement these measures, address the competitive disadvantages of TV broadcasters compared to on-demand services. In their contributions to the 20 15 Public consultation 4 Member States and 4 national regulators pointed out that the asymmetry in TV broadcasting and on-demand services regulation is unjustified and rends the current rules unfair. This view was also supported by 4 of the 9 public broa dcasters that commented on the issue of fairness. In any event, TV broadcasts that are intended for local audiences and do not form part of a national network which generally are not very large companies are often exempted see ANNEX 3.
Social impacts:. Under Option A consumers are not likely to be more exposed to European works than they are today. If TV broadcasters were to choose to invest a proportion of their programming budget in European content, there would be no assurance that it would be shown in peak hours. This would be particularly the case if this proportion is low. For on-demand services, as explained above a choice between a share and prominence of European works in their catalogues is not expected to lead to greater diversity. Impacts on cultural diversity: Given the amount of flexibility given to providers, the impact on access to information and culture Article 22 of the Charter would be negligible.
For TV broadcasters the status quo would be maintained. In addition, on-demand service providers would be required to report to the Commission on their compliance with these obligations. A Member State would be allowed to require a contr ibution e. Member States would be required to introduce exceptions for low audience and thematic on-demand servic e providers or for small and micro enterprises Economic impacts:. Substantive compliance costs: Compliance costs for on-demand services would vary across the Member States. In addition any potential compliance cost would be limited by the fact that usually on-demand services business model is based on revenue sharing.
It means that they do not incur any costs related to the acquisition of content upfront. They pay a share of the revenue generated to right holders. For on-demand service providers targeting other Member States which impose a financial contribution extra-territorially, the cost would vary across the EU. Currently, 9 Member States have f inancial contributions i.
All things being equal, we estimate that the costs for Netflix and i-Tunes to roll out the ir services in the five biggest EU markets would be respectively EUR 5. However, this compliance costs would translate into invest ment in content that service providers may be able to recoup. Another estimation where Member States would impose levies extraterritorially would result in costs between EUR 4. In France, where on-demand services must comply with requirements in terms of share and prominence of EU works, the cost of monitoring these two obligations has been estimated at EUR 2 see ANNEX The new requirements on on-demand services will be accompanied with reporting obligations.
For providers of on-demand services established in Member States where they are not subject to such obligations, the new requirement would increase their administrative burden. It should be noted, however, that reporting obligations would to some extent foster transparency in the on-demand services' business which would be a pre-requisite for assessing what role those players can play in the financing of content. In Member States imposing financial contributions extraterritorially, there might be limited additional costs for bus inesses to declare, pay and audit financial contributions if turnover is used as a fiscal base In their contributions to the Public consultation, the majority of the Cinema, Film and TV industry contributions 17 out of 30 ; all consumers organi zations that expressed an opinion 8 ; all employees organizations and trade unions that expressed an opinion 5 ; and the majority of right holders 10 out of 16 favor reinforcing current rules for on-demand services.
Impacts on the Internal market: The combined obligation for on-demand services to reserve a share for European works in on-demand services catalogues and to give prominence to those works would reduce the current fragmentation resulting from the very diverse approaches adopted by Member States see ANNEX As regards the possibility for Member States to impose financial contributions services providers may have to comply with different legislations. The level of fragmentation would depend on the number of Member States implementing financial contributions as well as on the number of service providers potentially concerned Allowing flexibility for Member States to impose financial contributions is considered as a justified and balanced way to limit forum shopping practices without u ndermining the COO principle and the objectives of the DSM.
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Impacts on competitiveness: For on-demand services established in the 15 Members States where there is already either an obligatory share of European works or prominence requirements in place, op tion B would lead to more level playing field. The flexibility for Members States to impose financial contributions on on-demand service providers located outside their territory would result in a more level playing field between on-demand services competi ng on the same market. According to many of the contributions to the Public consultation the strict application of the COO principle and the fragmentation on the transposition of Article 13 may have led to "forum shopping" practices i.
This has in turn created competition distortions and has undermined the effectiveness of the current rules This is the position of 5 Member States an d 1 national regulator ; a few public broadcasters 4 ; some members of the Cinema, Film and TV industry 5 ; and the majority of telecom operators and right holders who expressed and opinion 5 out of 9 and 5 out of 7, respectively.
As detailed in ANNEX 3, the audiovisual sector is highly concentrated and small on demand service providers would benefit from exemptions. The combination of sh are and prominence obligations on on-demand services would lead to consumers of on-demand services being more exposed to European works than they are today The imposition of financial contributions would have a positive impact on the creation of European audiovisual content as on-demand services providers may be required to increase their current contribution to co ntent creation.
The imposition of financial contributions extraterritorially may have a negative impact on the provision of cross-border on-demand services in some territories where some providers - most probably smaller ones - may not be able to recoup the financial contributions and the related administrative costs. Option B would have a positive impact on small independent producers.
Impacts on cultural diversity : The imposition of mandatory obligations on on-demand services providers would have a positive impact on cultural diversity Article 22 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as on-demand services providers may be required to increase their current contribution to content creation. However, there was very limited support to increase diversity by introducing sub-quotas for non-national European works. Indeed out of the In addition, there is no evidence that the industry would be able to r ecoup the cost of adapting their offer to the new sub-quotas in the absence of audience Some Member States have flagged their opposition to this approach This option has therefore not been impact assessed.
Compliance costs: nc. The cost of supervising on-demand services is not possible to estimate precisely but is likely to be close to status quo. For levies only costs can vary between EUR 4. The cost of complying with prominence requirements is not quantifiable. Cost of reporting for on-demand services would be higher than status quo but not quantifiable.
The status quo for TV broadcasters proposed under option B has proven to be efficient to promote cultural diversity while preserving their capacity to innovate. By reinforcing the mandatory character related to the share and prominence of European works in catalogue, option B will ensure that Member States take measures.
In turn this would increase the level of harmonisation while still leaving flexibility to Member States. This would entail limited administrative and compliance costs. The most significant costs result from option B and the possibility to apply financial contribution extra-territorially. However, financial contributions to audiovisual content creation are very close to cultural policy, which is a subsidiarity field. Option B seeks to bring this prerogative back to Member States, as intervention at EU level had not resulted in increased harmonization.
This option is therefore in full compliance with the subsidiarity principle. In addition, allowing Member States imposing financial contributions on on-demand service providers where their turnover is generated is the most efficient way to secure the contribution of those services to cultural diversity while increasing the level playing field in each national market.
Establish the conditions to ensure competitiveness impacts on the competitiveness.
Support European cultural diversity social impacts. TV broadcasts must not include seriously harmful programmes pornography and strong violence. They may include potentially harmful programmes erotic content and mild violence , but should do it in a way which prevents minors from hearing or seeing them. On-demand service providers are also required to take appropriate measures so that minors would not normally hear or see seriously harmful content.
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There are no restrictions for potentially harmful content for on-demand services. Economic outcome:. Existing costs: Maintaining the status quo would result in no additional administrative or compliance costs for regulatory authorities or media service providers. Existing administrative costs incurred by the regulators in most Member States relate to monitoring and enforcing compliance with these requirements. For TV broadcasting, this is done on the basis of complaints or on a systematic recording of all television programmes For on-demand services, the majority of r egulators do not regularly monitor compliance with the rules.
Most of them act on the basis of complaints. Some regulators monitor these rules through spot checks. The cost for reviewing and enforcing the provisions on the protection of minors amounts to a pproximately up to EUR per year per regulator Compliance costs for providers this includes telecom, cable, satellite, broadcasters and on-demand services can be divided into two categories: i direct costs, such as the costs of classifying audiovisual content as harmful to minors i.
For TV broadcasting, the majority of Member States impose the use of techniques based on the time at which the content is transmitted, i. As regards on-demand services, the majority of Member States require the use of technical measures to ensure that minors will not see or hear harmful material. The use of a PIN access code is one of the most common measures Direct costs are difficult to estimate as they are usually absorbed by the provider.
Both Pay TV and on-demand service providers reported significant costs for the provision of technical solutions to control the access and to provide information on harmful content. Costs related to control measures increase in relation to the number of new devices on the market such as tablets, smartphones or HDMI keys, which usually require ad hoc developments and investments. Some indirect costs can emer ge when classifying content as potentially harmful to minors, as it can narrow the targeted audience and have an impact on the number of transactions and subscriptions VoD and SVoD or on the attractiveness of the programmes for advertisers catch-up TV.
In principle, indirect costs for on-demand services could be expected to be lower, because the access to potentially harmful content is not restricted by the AVMSD. However, a majority of Member States have adopted stricter measures and require some form of protection e. PIN codes, content filtering for potentially harmful content Outcome on the Internal market: The lack of full harmonisation of the concept of harmful content and the lack of a harmonised age rating system has not been a reason not to provide cross border access given its limited cost. Outcome on competitiveness: Because of the different levels of requirements of the AVMSD, TV broadcasting is under more constraints than on-demand services.
This situation creates an undue competitive advantage for on-demand services, in particular with respect to Pay TV operators, with which they share similarities. The results of the public consultation indicate that, with the exception of some telecom operators and on-demand service providers, the majority of the respondents believe that this distinction is no longer relevant, effective or fair. Conversely, a high number of TV commercial broadcasters consider this distinction still relevant.
However, some Pay TV operators consider the distinction as no longer relevant. The changes in viewing patterns, especially of younger generations, highlighted in Section 2. The rules on protection of minors applicable to on-demand audiovisual media services would be strengthened by requiring them to restrict access to any kind of "harmful content" gratuitous violence, pornography erotic and mildly violent content The same rule would apply to TV broadacsters.
The most harmful content, such as gratuitous violence and pornography, shall be subject to the strictest measures providing a high degree of control, such as age verification pin codes or even by a "by default" mechanism that would not make this type of content available except when activated by an adult. The general provisions on self- and co-regulation Article 4 7 would be reinforced by indicating new benchmarks for the effectiveness of the existing and new codes. Economic impacts. Substantive compliance costs: On-demand service providers would need to assess and classify all offered programmes to see whether they fall within the scope of "potentially harmful" programmes.
There are on average 5 titles available in VoD catalogues There could be also additional compliance costs as regards technical control mechanisms. However, these compliance costs would be mitigated as at national level, Member States already require some form of protection e. PIN codes, content filtering for seriously harmful content and most of them also for "potentially harmful" content.
P rogramming the most harmful content would be a business decision that TV broadcasters will take if they are able to recoup the und erlying investment. Audiovisual media service providers would have to comply with the new information requirements. The associated costs would be mitigated in those Member States where similar mechanisms, such as age rating, are in place see ANNEX The studies available provide information on the costs of rating content according to different age groups, but no specific information on the cost of describing the harmful nature of the content. However, age rating costs detailed in the above paragraph can be used as benchmark as, once the content is classified and labelled as in the majority of the Member States , the additional cost of providing a description of the content is minimal.
Most Member States use rating systems all except Denmark, Estonia, Italy and Sweden and in most countries five age groups are defined. Although the age groups may vary, the different classifications are all generally based on similar criteria: presence of discrimination, drugs, imitative behavior, coarse language, nudity, sex, threatening content and violence.
Only in two countries, Finland and the Netherlands, the system is a combination of legally binding age rating and content descriptors indicating different categories of content violence, sex, anxiety, drug in Finland; violence, fear, sex, discrimination, drug and alcohol abuse, coarse language in Netherlands. Despite the costs incurred, some media service providers reported, in the Public consultation and the data gathering on costs and benefits , that a reliable system for the protection of minors can create a competitive advantage.
Being identified as a family-friendly provider can be a strong marketing argument and contributes to the positive branding of the operator. Administrative costs: There would be additional administrative costs for regulators for monitoring compliance with the new rules by providers of on-demand services, in particular in the 9 countries where there are no stricter rules in place see ANNEX Regulators already supervise the implementation of appropriate measures by on-demand services to protect minors from seriously harmful content.
They would need to go beyond and verify that those measures are applied to potentially harmful programmes. For example, a voluntary self-monitoring body in a Member State reported a cost of EUR for handling complaints 2 in For on-demand service providers, there would be some administrative costs in relatio n to a potential increase of complaints due to the wider scope of application of the provision on the protection of minors.
R egulators and media service providers would face administrative costs related to the implementation of the information requirement s, via co-regulation, in those Member States where similar mechanisms are not in place. The administrative costs related to the implementation of co-regulation will depend on the approach adopted. In an ambitious scenario, this could imply setting up a sys tem based on the creation of a specific organisation, rules and processes.
Impacts on the Internal market: simplifying the definition of harmful conten t could result in the most harmful content for example, but not limited to, hardcore pornography being consistently subject to effective access controls, across the EU Impacts on competitiveness: Harmonising the level of requirements between TV broa dcasting, in particular pay TV services , and on demand services will increase the level playing field. In the frame of the data gathering on costs and benefits, pay TV reported high costs for the provision of technical solutions to control the access and provide information on harmful content.
Two of them complained about the lower set of restrictions applied to on demand services while both type of services provide similar technical measures to restrict the access to harmful content. For on-demand services, the extension of the existing requirements to potentially harmful content is likely to have an impact in terms of their revenues in particular in the countries where there are no stricter rules in place.
Less content would be accessible to their widest possible audience. On-demand service providers may therefore incur a loss of revenues be it in terms of number of transactions and subscription VoD and SVoD or of advertising catch up TV. In a context where children consume significant quantities of on-demand content see Section 2. Several surveys have found that consumers expect seamless protection in online video services This is why in the majority of Member States, industry has already adopted self-regulatory measures to protect minors also from potentially harmful content even in the cases where no regulatory measures are in place re garding this type of content.
The possibility for TV brodacsters services to broadcast the most harmful content wil be mitigated by the fact that this content shall be subject to the strictest measures, such as encryption and PIN codes. In some Member Stat es erotic content which would most probably be considered as pornographic in other Member States is subject to encryption and PIN codes without posing a threat to the protection of minors.
In addition new generation of devices such as Smart TV will add a s econd possible layer of protection Against this backdrop, the majority of ERGA-members supported the idea that the most harmful content could be allowed on TV broadcasting services, provided an adequate access control mechanism is in place Requirements on the provision of information would have a positive impact on consumer protection by ensuring transparency on the potential harm of content. Yet it still remains more limited than for TV broadcasters.
Setting requirements on content information w ould have a limited impact on freedom of expression as it does not imply age rating but only transparency measures. Administrative costs: not substantial. F or most on-demand services the costs would be limited as some Member States require some form of protection e. PIN codes, content filtering fo r "potentially harmful" content Option A would tackle the current deficit of fair treatment between TV broadcasters and on-demand services and would improve the level playing field.
Option A would also have a positive impact on the internal market through an increased level of availability of information at a limited cost co-regulatory mechanisms. This approach through co-regulation would also be more effective in terms of protection of minors and would be achieved without impinging on Member States subsidiarity and in line with the minimum level of harmonisation feature of the AVMSD. Option A is the preferred option.
In order to determine which Member State has jurisdiction over an audiovisual media service provider, the AVMSD focuses on a number of criteria place where editorial decisions are taken, head office, etc. For TV broadcasting, derogations should be based on grounds of incitement to hatred or protection of minors. For on-demand services, there are more grounds, including public policy, public security including the safeguarding of national security and defence the protection of public health and the protection of consumers.
An emergency procedure is foreseen only for on demand services. For situations where there might be circumvention of the stricter rules of another Member State a procedure is in place circumvention procedure. The above-mentioned procedures will be hereafter collectively referred to as "cooperation procedures". Existing costs: Maintaining the status quo would result in no additional costs. The COO avoids regulatory inefficiencies which would result from subjecting one service to multiple jurisdictions.
Media service providers incur low compliance costs as a consequence of being subject to the legislation of the country of establishment only. However, given the complexity of the current rules, some Regulators have recently been subject to a heavy administrative burden.
For example, in a recent Lithuanian case ANNEX 9 , extensive consultations and written exchanges between the Swedish and the Lithuanian regulators took place. Those exchanges could be equaled to a workload of hours shared by the two regulators. T he increased use of the complex cooperation procedures has led to costs to regulators and to the Commission.
As a benchmark, the Lithuanian case referred to above represented a workload of roughly hours over three months for the case handler, and a total additional workload of approximately hours for supervisors and other Commission services involved Based on recent experience, it would seem reasonable to reckon the number of cases with up to 5 per year. Outcome Internal market: In spite of the broad support for the COO principle , Member States ack nowledge a need for addressing actual problems in the application of the principle.
In particular, they refer to the complexity of the jurisdiction criteria and the ineffectiveness of the cooperation procedures see ANNEX 9. Maintaining the status quo wou ld mean leaving these application issues unaddressed which would fuel opposition to the COO principle as such.
A minority of Member States plead for limited departures to a country of destination principle. Outcome on competitiveness: The COO principle p rovides legal certainty by subjecting media service providers in the EU to the legislation of one Member State only. By keeping administrative and compliance costs for providers low and allowing for economies of scale, the COO principle in turn facilitates investment in the media sector The complexity of jurisdiction rules and derogation procedures can undermine the positive impact of the COO principle on the competitiveness of media service providers.
Social outcome:. The COO ensures diversity and has fostered the availability of content by facilitating the cross border provision of audiovisual programmes. This is particularly true in smaller markets where service providers would otherwise not be interested in rolling out their services and incurring th e cost of compliance with a specific legislation. In some cases, the number of services provided from other Member States is higher than the number of domestic services While the COO might potentially lead to different degrees of consumer protection, co nsumers have only exceptionally complained about the application of the COO principle This can be explained by the fact that consumers are protected by the consumer protection rules of the Directive.
For instance the derogation procedure allows Member States to take measures against incitement to hatred and infringement of the prote ction of minors rules on TV broadcasting. Tangerine Sean Baker, :. Suffused with foul language and the skirmishes of ethnic and sexual minorities, through it all a level of forgiveness and acceptance is discovered. The contrasts of a Christmas setting with the scantily glad characters is extended in the hip-hop dubstep score, serving to go against the grain of festive songs, and induce one into the world of Sin-Dee and Mya.
Instead of a Christmas tradition of Miracle on 34th Street, Tangerine should be your new annual festive watch! Still, behind the arduous filming, Christmas is depicted as a time of paranoia, overwhelming urges to commit adultery and masochistic sex grounds in New York. Elle Paul Verhoeven, :. Casting a long shadow over those around her in a room, the gravitas to which Isabelle Huppert brings to the character infuses her with an emotional tapestry. The Dutch director is no strange to provocative filmmaking and this Christmas time why not enjoy the magnificent Isabelle Huppert as an early gift to yourself?
Using the subject matter of family and the bourgeoisies in France, the Dutch director and iconic French actor combine to offer a deeply sardonic take on a Christmas meal that goes awfully wrong. The religious elements of the Christian tradition are similarly called into question over its narrative.
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Costumed by Nathalie Raoul, Huppert is at her finest Parisian chic. No dirty alternative Christmas film list would be complete without these pesky little creatures and their complete and utter destruction of a small American town Kingston Falls. Accompanied by the literal destruction of a modern Christmas, Gremlins is as rebellious to the notion of consumerism as the little critters are to any human being.
A dirty classic in every sense of the word. Featuring a drunk Christmas office party and the ramifications that feature when one drinks too much around someone who you hold a crush towards, Billy Wilder, Jack Lemon, Fred MacMurray and Shirley MacLaine star in this misery infused classic about how unfestive Christmas and life truly can be. With some of the finest dialogue in film, Wilder crafts a stunning piece of dark comedy. After the legendary singer David Bowie sadly passed away this year, why not let his presence be known in your life again, not through his music, but through his performance in Nagisa Oshima.
The Christmas spirit is replaced with death, fire and evil demons coming to ruin your presents and much cherished family.